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ABSTRACT 
          Using data on environmental issues drawn from 41 series of poll questions and federal 
outlay in 43 years (1965-2007) and a content analysis of newspaper articles, television news 
summaries, and presidential documents in 28 years (1980-2007), with the multivariate Granger 
Causality test based on Vector Autoregression (VAR) models and bivariate Granger Causality (F 
and Chi-squire) tests, the study finds that public opinion has little influences on federal 
environmental expenditure in the past several decades. It also finds that for the presidents, the 
media, and the public, their agendas (volume of information) cause a change in their attitudes 
(tone toward the environment) and that the casualties in the agenda and frame building and 
setting processes are essentially confirmed by the multivariate test, but feedback influences are 
also identified through the bivariate tests. The multivariate test also shows an influence from the 
presidential agenda to the public agenda on environmental issues, with no influence identified 
the other way around. The implications of the proposed five-level integrated model of media 
effects are also discussed. 
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Exploring the Dynamics in the Environmental Discourse: The Longitudinal Interaction 
Among Public Opinion, Presidential Opinion, Media Coverage, Policymaking in 3 Decades 
and an Integrated Model of Media Effects 
Environmental communication scholars have been trying to answer the question of 
whether the public, which usually does not have a lot of expertise in environmental science, is 
capable of making substantial contributions to the process of environmental policymaking 
(Fischer 2017). Jurgen Habermas, who believed that the public should be the decision-makers on 
any topics in his early ages, later agreed that decision-making on some issues, such as 
environmental protection, required expertise and most citizens were actually “unqualified to 
participate in” (Fischer 2000, p8). Some other scholars argued that the public ought not to have 
any impact on energy and environment policies, which should be left to technical experts 
(Morone and Woodhouse 1989). The current administration under President Donald Trump, who 
withdrew the U. S. from the Paris Agreement on carbon emissions reduction (Kim and Cooke 
2018), seems to side with this line of argument.. 
Scholars on the other side of the argument, however, believe that the public should be and 
is the final decision-maker of environmental and energy issues (Smith 2002). The general public 
may lack the specialty to make important decisions on environmental issues, but they can obtain 
necessary knowledge from the media and interpersonal deliberation processes, if those processes 
are provided (Fischer 2000, 2017). Smith (2002) finds that the environmental policy 
development has followed a model: the expanded interest groups lobby Congress for new laws; 
when pollsters find public opinion supporting the new laws, Congress goes along. Smith (2002) 
illustrates this model with the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 and the 
Clean Air Act of 1970, the establishment of the Council on Environmental Quality in White 
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House, and the creation of the “environmental impact statement” (EIS) process, all of which 
followed that pattern. Presidents are also found responsive to the public’s environmental 
demands in previous research. For instance, President Richard Nixon responded to the public call 
for a lower oil price with wage and price control, which might have made the energy situation 
worse in the long term but pleased the voters in the short term (Smith 2002); president Bill 
Clinton blocked Congress’s drastic revision of the Clean Water Act in 1994  in response to 
public dissatisfaction with the bill (Vig 2013). Public opinion has also determined the fate of 
nuclear energy and offshore drilling in some cases (Freudenburg and Gramling 1994; Gramling 
1996; Morone and Woodhouse 1989).           
The environment has been a political issue in developed countries for decades (Hodgson 
1976; Kim and Cooke 2018). A group of studies found that the presidents influence the media 
and the public and that the media influence the public on environmental issues (Gavin 2018; Kim 
and Cooke 2018). Researchers of agenda-setting (McCombs and Reynolds 2009; McCombs and 
Shaw 1972; Wanta and Alkazemi 2017), priming (Iyengar 1991; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; 
Wanta and Tarasevich 2019), and framing (Borah 2011; Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar 
2016; Scheufele 1999; Tewksbury & Scheufele 2009), have also found in separate studies that 
the president or political establishments influence the media coverage, and that the media 
influence the public perception. So overall, in the intricate discourses on environmental issues, 
how have the presidents, the public, and the media interacted with each other to influence  
environmental policymaking?  
This study uses accumulated yearly data from public opinion polls and federal 
environmental budgets from 1965 to 2007, a content analysis of presidential documents and 
media coverage of environmental issues from 1980 to 2008 on a quarterly base, and a yearly 
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dataset converted from the quarterly to connect the quarterly dataset of content analyses to the 
yearly data of public opinion polls, to explore how the public interacted with the president and 
the mass media on environmental policymaking . Longitudinal data, with their intrinsic temporal 
factors, can provide stronger evidence of causality than cross-sectional data (Liu 2015). Those 
three to four decades cover several presidencies and a variety of developmental stages of 
environmental issues (Kraft 2000). Knowledge of the interaction of the public, the presidents, the 
media, and policymaking in those decades can lend us deeper understanding of the dynamic 
discourses among the three parties, which is still a focus of academic discussion of media effects 
(Wanta and Alkazemi 2017). This inquiry is especially important now as environmental issues 
become more urgent (Kim and Cooke 2018). 
Presidents, News Media and the Public on the Environment 
Presidents have been a major factor shaping the policy and discourses of the environment 
in the United States (Yao, Liu and Reeves 2013). As early as the beginining of the 20th century, 
Theodore Roosevelt started to address environmental issues, which was later also added to the 
speeches and legislative programs of Kennedy and Johnson. Nixon was the first to formally put 
environmental issues on the political plan, establishing the Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and setting up air and water quality 
control policies. In his brief tenure following Nixon’s resignation, Ford passed the 1975 Energy 
and Conservation Act, loosening the control on domestic oil production. Carter, entered the 
White House with a goal of enhancing the US oil independence as a response to the 1973 Oil 
Crisis, established the Department of Energy (DOE). He also pushed the production and usage of 
alternative fuels (Smith 2002).  
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Reagan, according to Vig (2013), ended the environmental decade in the 1970s by 
weakening many policies of environmental regulation, appointing antienvironmental people to 
head the EPA, Secretary of Interior, or other environment-related agencies, and severely cutting 
their budgets. He also attempted to abolish the CEQ and the DOE, abandoned alternative-fuel 
programs, and increased off-shore drilling. His antienvironmental fame made his vice president 
and follower George H. W. Bush changed his policy when entering the White House, appointing 
environmental activists to EPA, CEQ, and other related positions, and passing the Clean Air 
Amendments of 1990, although Bush withdrew on environmental progress at the later period of 
his presidency, threatening to boycott the UN conference on Environment and Development and 
refused to sign a biodiversity treaty at the conference (Yao, Liu and Reeves 2013). Clinton took 
office with an environmentalist vice president, Al Gore, who were charged with the 
responsibility to coordinate all environmental policies and earned them the name of the “green 
administration” (Vig 2013). He reversed the Regan and Bush policies widely criticized by 
environmentalists, issued executive orders requiring federal agencies to select approaches not 
only economic but also environmental and healthy and pursue environmental justice (Yao 2011). 
He was also the president speaking for the environment with the highest volume, particularly in 
his second term (Yao, Liu and Reeves 2013). George W. Bush showed a pro-environmental 
stance when he first took office, with his EPA announced several major environmental decisions. 
But he soon changed his direction, cutting budgets for environmental agencies, criticizing 
environmental programs and undertaking, such as the Kyoto Protocol. But at the end of his 
presidency in 2009, he still established the Marine National Monument in the Mariana Trench to 
protect the ecological system (Yao, Liu and Reeves 2013). 
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The mass media are another major shaper of the public discourse and policy on the 
environment. When the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill and the 1989 Exxon Valdez accident 
happened, the vivid images on TV and in newspaper pictures scared the public, imprinting in 
people’s mind a strong association of the oil industry with environmental disasters (Smith 2002). 
A content analysis of TV news on the environment in 1991-1995, a mid-segment of the period 
for this study, revealed that politics, disasters, and unusual weather were the predominate themes 
(Shanahan and McComas 1999). Researchers also found that, in the 1970s-1980s, the public 
thought of environmental issues as more important when the mass media coverage of those 
issues increased, not when the environmental issues in the real world deteriorated (Ader 1995). 
The variation of public sentiment on the environment, overall rising significantly since the 1970s 
when environmental issues became conspicuous on the mass media, has associated with changes 
in environmental policy in the past four decades (Kraft and Vig 2013). 
Theoretical Framework 
In the existing literature, the popular theoretical tools that scholars use to examine the 
dynamic among the political establishments such as the presidents, the mass media, and the 
public are agenda setting (McCombs and Reynolds 2009; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Wanta and 
Foote 1994; Wanta and Alkazemi 2017), priming (Iyengar 1991; Iyengar and Kinder 1987), and 
framing (Borah 2011; Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar 2016; Edy and Meirick 2007; 
Scheufele 1999; Tewksbury & Scheufele 2009). Those three theories distinguish from but also 
intertwine with each other (McCombs and Shaw 1993; Moy and Bosch 2013; Scheufele 2000; 
Scheufele & Iyengar 2017; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).  
Agenda Setting 
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Agenda setting essentially predicts that the media agenda leads the public agenda 
(McCombs and Reynolds 2009; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Wanta and Alkazemi 2017). The 
core concept, agenda, is generally conceptualized as salience (Edelstein 1993; McCombs and 
Shaw 1993), or, “the importance that media and audience accord to an event”(Edelstein 1993, 
p85; Kosicki 1993). Importance is operationalized as the hierarchy, or rank, of the issues 
(Sheafer and Weimann 2005; Wanta and Alkazemi 2017), measured by “the amount of space or 
time devoted to particular issues” by the media and either “the amount of attention people pay to 
issues” or “their judgments of the issues’ importance” (Kosicki 1993, p105; Iyengar and Kinder 
1987). 
Some scholars have been concerned that agenda setting research has kept itself from 
making “more reliable and content-orientated observations” (Edelstein 1993, p86; McLeod, 
Becker, and Byrnes 1974; Winter 1981). The measurement of agenda bypasses the earlier 
scholastic focus of media persuasion (Moy and Bosch 2013) and skips the cognitive structuring 
of the issues (Lang and Lang 1982; Moy, Tewksbury, and Rinke 2016). Scholars, as Edelstein 
(1993) notes, call for a higher order of cognitive analysis. Partly responding to that concern of 
media effects research, agenda-setting research extended to the second level, in which the unit of 
analysis turns from the objects to the attributes of the objects (Craft and Wanta 2003; McCombs 
and Reynolds 2009; Wanta and Alkazemi 2017) and even the third level, in which (Cheng 2016; 
Guo and McCombs 2016; Vu, Guo, and McCombs 2014) the unit further turns into the 
information network, possibly having diluted the term and metaphor by equating it to the whole 
media effects in practice. The proposal of the second level of agenda-setting concept, however, 
created a contention with researchers of framing effects (Scheufele 2000; Tewksbury and 
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Scheufele 2009; Weaver, McCombs, and Shaw 2004), which will be discussed in detail later in 
this essay. 
Priming 
Priming holds that media agenda primes an issue and put it as a criterion for the public to 
evaluate a politician (Iyengar 1991; Moy and Bosch 2013) and is commonly seen as a temporal 
extension of the agenda-setting process (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; McCombs and Reynolds 
2009; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007; Sheafer and Weimann 2005; Wanta and Tarasevich 2019) 
or at least closely related to it (Moy, Tewksbury, and Rinke 2016). Iyengar and Kinder (1987, 
p70) argued that priming effects happen because “problems covered by television news become 
more accessible and therefore more important in the viewer’s political calculus.” Individuals 
tend to rely on memory-based processing of information and retrieve the most salient memory to 
make decisions (Moy and Bosch 2013). Sheafer and Weimann (2005) extended the priming 
research to electoral behavior because voters’ higher evaluation would help the politicians be 
elected. Their data support this extension.  
Psychologists tended to use behaviors or behavioral intentions as the independent 
variable of priming research, but also include “impressions, judgments, goals, and actions” as 
independent variables (Molden 2014). They found that viewing violent television programs 
increased aggression intentions and behaviors and that exposure to music videos portraying 
stereotypical images of men and women led to more stereotypical impressions of genders (Moy 
and Bosch 2013; Roskos-Ewoldson, Roskos-Ewoldsen, and Carpentier 2009). A synthesis 
review of priming studies, therefore, defined priming as “the effects of the content of the media 
on people’s later behavior or judgments related to the content that was processed” (Roskos-
Ewoldson, Roskos-Ewoldsen, and Carpentier 2009, p74-75). 
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Framing 
Framing research is mainly conducted in two approaches: framing studies (what are the 
frames and how they are formulated) and framing effects studies (how message frames influence 
audience frames. Borah 2011; Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar 2016).  Goffman (1974/1986) 
initiated the approach of framing studies. For him, frames are the “basic elements” used to define 
the situations, which are created by the society and to which people respond, usually 
unconsciously, in their lives (Goffman 1974/1986, p11). Gans (1979, p19) found that journalists 
always organized and interpreted news stories with the news categories that connected “a wide 
variety of once unrelated stories”. Besides, a news story “contains values” and suggests “a 
picture of nation and society as it ought to be” (Gans 1979, p39). Gitlin (1980, p7) described 
media frames as “professional patterns of cognition, interpretation and presentation, of selection, 
emphasis and exclusion, by which symbol handlers routinely organize discourses, whether verbal 
or visual.” Pan and Kosicki (1993) further identified four framing devices: syntactical structure, 
script structure, thematic structure, and rhetorical structure. The tone in the news stories, argues 
Iyengar (1991), is also an important format of political framing. Because researchers define 
“framing” in different ways (Borah 2011), there is also a call to narrow down the broad spectrum 
of definitions to produce a more precise one (Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar 2016). 
The approach of framing effects studies is originated from the fields of psychology 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Tversky and Kahneman 1981) and political science (Druckman 
2001; Iyengar 1991). In a series of experiments Tversky and Kahneman (1981) consistently 
found that, when the same problems are framed in different ways, participants make significantly 
different decisions. Iyengar (1991, p3) found that thematic news reports increased “attributions 
of responsibility to government and society” whereas episodic reports have “the opposite effect.” 
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Druckman and associates found that political elites’ choice of frames, usually communicated 
through mass media, influences public opinion (Druckman 2001, 2004; Druckman and Nelson 
2003). Studies also showed that different frames of the same information affected audience’s 
decisions about reduction of university funding (Price, Tewksbury, and Powers 1997), 
audience’s issue perception and consequent attitudes toward stem cells, the environment (Shen 
2004), and welfare (Shen and Edwards 2005), and audience’s personal framing of religion (Yao 
2007). Framing inherent in media coverage and is about the content of the news (Moy and Bosch 
2013; Moy, Tewksbury, and Rinke 2016). 
Toward a Five-Level Integrated Media Effects Model 
The relationship between agenda setting and framing, particularly framing effects, has been 
hotly discussed in the past two decades (Borah 2011; Moy and Bosch 2013). Agenda setting 
researchers believe that the framing effects studies are essentially the second-level of agenda-
setting studies (Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar 2016; McCombs and Shaw 1993; Weaver, 
McCombs, and Shaw 2004), but framing researchers argue that agenda setting only addresses 
part of the complex interrelationship among media, public opinion, and public policymaking 
(Kosicki 1993) and that agenda setting and framing effects are processed with different 
psychological mechanisms (Scheufele 2000; Tewksbury and Scheufele 2009). The emotional 
tone, or valence, of the news stories and photos, Coleman (2010) believe, is affective framing as 
well as attributes, the independent variable of second-level agenda-setting. Agenda setting and 
framing effects are two closely related theories, both predicting how media influence the public, 
how media are influenced by social establishments (McCombs and Reynolds 2009; Moy and 
Bosch 2013; Scheufele 1999), and how those influences are based on “selection” and “salience” 
(Entman 1993; McCombs and Shaw 1993; Pan and Kosicki 1993; Soroka 2002). Their 
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independent variables and dependent variables, however, seem to be different. Agendas of 
objects or attributes are measured with the amount of media coverage ranking of importance in 
audience mind, but frames are measured by constructing the meaning and usually contain moral 
components (Entman 1993; Moy, Tewksbury, and Rinke 2016). Agenda setting research holds 
that “it is likely that increased salience of an issue will result in more public knowledge and 
stronger public opinions, but it is less certain what direction that opinion will take” (McCombs, 
Einsiedel, and Weaver 1991, p19). Framing research, however, explores how the media interpret 
an issue will influence the public’s interpretation (knowledge, Edy and Meirick 2007), moral 
judgment (attitude), and remedies (behavior. Entman 1993).  
          Because agenda setting, priming, and framing seem to be so closely intertwined, it is 
nearly impossible to draw clear-cut lines between them and many researchers actually use those 
terms interchangeably (Borah 2011; Wanta and Tarasevich 2019); so other scholars have called 
for a convergence of the three lines of research (Aday 2006; Iyengar 1991). Given that the 
argument that agenda-setting and framing effects are media effects at different levels (Kosicki 
1993; Edy and Meirick 2007), a five-level media effects model that integrates agenda setting, 
priming, and framing effects may help to understand how mass media can influence the 
audience. Such a multilevel media-effects model was also inspired by advertising effects 
research, which traditionally has been studied message effects at cognitive, affective, and 
conative levels (Lavidge and Steiner 1961; Leckenby and Wedding 1982; Yao et al. 2018). 
Media researchers have also proposed studies on media effects at different levels, such as at 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral levels (Mcleod and Reeves 1980). Communication 
researcher Everett Rogers’ (2003) Diffusion of Innovation model has five steps of processing of 
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innovative information, and persuasion researcher William McGuire’s (1989) domino model has 
twelve levels of message effects, ranging from exposure to post-behavioral consolidation.  
          Generally speaking, five levels — attention, agenda (issue importance), knowledge 
(information or cognition), attitude, and behavior — might be enough to summarize media 
effects documented in the literature of the three theories, agenda-setting, priming, and framing, 
and other attitude and behavior studies (such as Rogers 2003). The three theories mainly 
articulate the horizontal influences in the model, predicting that media contents at one level have 
a stronger influence on the audience at the same level than on other levels. Meanwhile, they also 
argue for the vertical influence, predicting that the accumulation of media effects at lower levels 
linearly procures media effects at higher levels (See Figure 1). The dynamic of this five-level 
media effects is clear in a hypothetic one-flow information situation. It should also be true in a 
two or multiple-flow information situation, where the media stimulus is the sum-up of the 
positive messages and negative messages.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Attention. Attention, for media, is the amount of coverage; for the audience, it is the 
amount of attentive media exposure. Attention is the lowest level of media effects. When the 
editor is producing something for people to read, watch, or listen, “he is thereby putting a claim 
on their attention,” which may further influence people’s decision what to think about (Cohen 
1963, p13). Although some models include a level of exposure (e.g., McGuire 1989), Chaffee 
and Schleuder (1986) have shown that it is more meaningful to put attention as the initial level of 
the media effects model so that the inattentive media exposure won’t be included, which is 
supported by later researchers (Drew and Weaver 1990; Slater and Rasinski 2005; Valkenburg 
and Peter 2013). 
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Agenda (importance). Although some researchers confuse media attention with media 
agenda, the two are actually different concepts (Becker 1982). Agenda refers to issue importance 
(Wanta and Alkazemi 2017). Media messages are always ranked in the order of importance by 
the journalists: As Gans (1979) notes, television news programs are structured like a newspaper, 
with the day’s most important story being the lead and other important hard news filled in the 
first two sections, whereas news magazines put the most important stories in the weekly cover 
story section and national, international, and business sections in the front of the magazine. It is 
media agenda, not media attention, that is the strong predictor of audience agenda. Iyengar and 
Kinder (1987), for instance, found that stories at the top of the broadcast were more influential in 
setting the public’s agenda. Once the effects of those important stories were controlled, it was 
hard to find any effects due to news stories that appear elsewhere. Some studies use the term 
“media attention,” but actually also measure the prominence of media coverage (placing on the 
front page, longer than other articles, with pictures, or graphs, etc.), and so what is really tested 
in those studies is media agenda (Andrews and Caren 2010). Those indicator of prominence 
plays a key role to make the audience perceive the issue of coverage important (Holmqvist and 
Wartenberg 2005; Holsanova, Rahm, and Holmqvist 2006) and the audience can easily pick up 
those cues (Moy, Tewksbury, and Rinke 2016). Of course, most of the hundreds of agenda-
setting studies conducted so far confirm the influence of media agenda on public agenda, with 
cross-sectional data at two points of the time (McCombs and Reynolds 2009; McCombs and 
Shaw 1972; Moy and Bosch 2013; Moy, Tewksbury, and Rinke 2016; Wanta and Foote 1994). 
H1: Media agenda on environmental issues sets public agenda on 
environmental issues. 
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Knowledge (information or cognition). News stories and opinion pieces convey 
knowledge, maximizing “both information and drama” (McCombs, Einsiedel, and Weaver 1991, 
p34). That the public perceives some issues as important does not necessarily mean that it 
understands those issues. For instance, most people think of global warming as important, but 
they give wrong answers to knowledge test about global warming in the polls (Nisbet and Myers 
2007; Smith 2002). The volume of the information in the media content determines public 
knowledge. Importance perceived by the public (public agenda) can also indirectly enhance 
public knowledge. Hutchings (2005) found that when citizens perceived a political issue as 
important, they gave more attention to it, gained more information about it from the media, and 
were more likely to attend legislative activities to solve it. Chaffee, Ward, and Tipton (1970) also 
suggested that Klapper (1960) would have found a strong media effect had he examined the 
audience’s knowledge rather than attitude. 
Attitudes. Media frames are constructed with value or attitude components (Entman 1993; 
Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Pan and Kosicki 1993). Just looking at the frequency that the 
attitude factors (positive or negative) appears and neglecting media agenda (importance) 
associated with these factors, cautioned Entman (1993), could generate a distorted measure of 
the media attitude in the original texts. Audience reactions to media contents also have attitudinal 
components, which should not be mixed up with other components in those reactions. Scholars, 
for instance, found a distinction between American people’s emotional reaction to and their 
cognitive evolution of Congress (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1998) and between Chinese 
students’ cognitive knowledge of and their political attitudes toward religion (Yao 2007). 
Audience’s attitude, nevertheless, can be developed from the accumulation of s knowledge, as 
shown in Rogers’ (2003) five-step model of adoption. Priming depicts that the media agenda, 
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through audience agenda, influences audience cognitive knowledge and hence attitude. It 
illustrates that “media emphasis on particular issues not only confers status (or increase salience), 
but also activates in people’s memories previously acquired information about these issues,” 
which “thus is then used in forming opinions about persons, groups, or institutions linked to 
these issues” (McCombs, Einsiedel, and Weaver 1991, p19).  
H2: Public agenda on environmental issues influences public attitude on the 
environmental issues. 
Several empirical studies reported that media attitude leads to changes in audience attitude. 
Page and Shapiro (1992, p344) found that, in the period of 1969-1983, “what appears on TV 
news,” especially the attitude of news commentaries and reported expert opinions, “accounts in 
large part for the relatively short-term (neither instantaneous nor glacial) changes in public 
opinion.” Chang (1992) found that, compared to news sorties, editorials, which had more 
attitudinal components, had a stronger positive correlation with public opinion six months late. 
Zaller (1992, p59) argued that media attitude could lead to change in the audience attitude 
because media coverage would make a particular consideration (containing both “cognitive 
elements” and “affect”) more accessible in the audience’s mind and easier to be expressed when 
the audience is asked to give an opinion or attitude. Attitude change, Zaller (1992, p266) 
concludes, “results from change in the mix of ideas to which individuals are exposed.” Most 
framing-setting studies also confirm that media interpretation of an issue, cognitively, 
affectively, or behavior-relatedly, influence the public interpretation of that issue (Borah 2011; 
Edy and Meirick 2007; Scheufele 1999; Tewksbury and Scheufele 2009). 
H3: Media attitude on environmental issues influences public attitude on 
environmental issues. 
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Behavior. Media frames, even those in printed stories, contain behavioral components, 
which can influence the audience’s behavior. In Entman’s (1993) oft-cited definition of frames, 
defining problems and diagnosing causes are at the cognitive knowledge level, making moral 
judgment involves attitudes, and suggesting remedies is apparently at the behavioral level. A 
large body of media violence literature also showed that viewing media violence increases 
subsequent aggressive behavior (Bandura, Ross, and Ross 1963; Berkowitz and Rawlings 1963). 
A meta-analysis of 217 studies, from 1957 to 1990, about the influence of violent television 
viewing on subsequent aggressive acts concludes that the amount of violent television viewing is 
positively associated with the degree of subsequent aggressive behaviors (Paik and Comstock 
1994).  Media sexuality literature also suggests that consuming sexual media contents has 
behavioral consequences (Harris and Barlett 2009). 
          Sources and Consequences of Media Effects. For a long time, agenda-setting 
research has identified social establishments as agenda setters of the mass media (Rogers, 
Dearing, and Bregman 1993). Framing research similarly maintains that social 
establishments set frames for the media (Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar 2016; 
Scheufele 1999). Zaller’s (1992) RAS model also holds that political elites dominate 
public opinion through the media. Combining those findings and the five-level integrated 
model, we have  
H4: Presidential agenda on environmental issues sets the media agenda on 
environmental issues.  
H5: Presidential attitude on environmental issues influences media attitude 
on environmental issues. 
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Smith’s (2002) argument that public opinion on environmental issues influences 
environmental policy is supported by some studies from other areas. Hartley (1995) found that 
public opinion was responsive to the news coverage of the strength of the Soviet military and it 
had a significant influence on the US military budget. Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson (2002) 
found that lagged public opinion significantly influences the governmental policy activities, and 
there is no meaningful response of the public opinion on the policy activities. A time-series 
analysis of data from 1960-1998 (Agnone 2007) also finds increasing support of environmental 
issues in public opinion leads to the increase of passages of environmental bills in that year. 
H6: Public attitude on environmental issues influences policymaking on 
environmental issues. 
There could also be other relationships among those factors. For instance, a study finds that 
President Trump’s announcement of withdrawing from the Paris Agreement made the following 
public discussion of the topic on Twitter more polarized, swaying the public agenda and attitude 
(Kim and Cooke 2018). This study also explores 
RQ1: What are the other relationships among the media, the public, and the 
presidents on environmental issues? 
Methods 
          Two sets of data were collected for the study first: media coverage and presidential 
documents on environmental issues from January 1, 1980 to December 31, 2007 (28 years). 
Searched with keywords “environment,” “environmental,” “environmentalist,” or 
“environmentalism,” 531 news articles (keywords in headlines) were collected from the A 
Sections of The New York Times and the Washington Post, oft-used as representatives of national 
newspapers on many issues (Chang 1992), including environment-related issues (Pan, 
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Opgenhaffen, and Van Gorp, 2019), through LexisNexis; 476 documents (keywords in all text) 
were selected from the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, an oft-used source of 
presidential opinion (Domke, Graham, Coe, John, and Coopman 2006; Wanta and Foote 1994) 
through the HeinOnline database. With the keyword “environment,” 327 summaries of evening 
news stories from ABC, CBS, and NBC were found from the Vanderbilt Television News 
Archive (Boykoff 2008; Wanta and Foote 1994). CNN, the cable TV that provided news content 
to about 1% of the adult audience in the study period (Althaus 2002), was not included in this 
data due to lack of access to its content or summaries. Online news sources were not included in 
the sample because they only started to pick up an audience since 2004 (Waldman 2011), near 
the end of the data collection period (1980-2007), and therefore do not provide rich longitudinal 
data. A content analysis was conducted to these pieces, and a randomly drawn sub-sample of 150 
articles/summaries and documents was first coded by two of the researchers for coding reliability 
test. The intercoder reliability, Scott’s pi, for the tone, the only subjective type of codes in the 
content analysis part of this study, was 0.836. Pieces containing the keywords that had meanings 
unrelated to the purpose of this study were removed from the sample and not included in the 
numbers reported above. 
Next, the public opinion poll data were drawn from the “Public Opinion Location Library 
or Public Opinion Online” maintained by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 
(containing data from the polls by Gallup, Harris, Roper, ABC, CBS, CNN, NBC, Los Angeles 
Times, New York Times, USA Today and Wall Street Journal since 1935) and the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Totally 47 series poll questions were 
found asking respondents how they would rate the importance of the environment, a classic way 
of measuring public agenda, and whether they thought more financial support should be granted 
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to environmental protection, a preferred way of measuring public attitude toward the 
environment (Johnson 2005), from 2 to 150 times during 1965-2007 (43 years). A quarterly and 
a yearly series measuring public agenda and a yearly series measuring public attitude (due to the 
lack of data points) were drawn from those questions with WCalc, a software tool to draw a 
latent series from a group of series measuring the same topic with missing time points among 
them (Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydstun 2008; Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002; Jerit 
2008; Stimson 1994; Stimson 1999; Voeten and Brewer 2006). To keep higher reliability, series 
whose correlations with the latent series were lower than 0.5 were not included in the analysis.  
Variables 
           Media Agenda and Presidential Agenda. The monthly (or yearly) amounts of media 
articles/summaries and the amount of presidential documents appearing during a quarter (or a 
year) were calculated as the measures of media agenda and presidential agenda for that particular 
quarter (or year. Page and Shapiro 1992; Yao, Liu and Reeves 2013).  
Media Attitude and Presidential Attitude. Media attitude and presidential attitude of a 
month (or year) were operationalized with the sums of the tones of media articles/summaries 
and the presidential documents toward the environment during the quarter (or year). Tone was 
measured by a five-point scale adopted from Page and Shapiro’s (1992) study, in which 2 = 
highly supportive (no negative words), 1 = supportive, 0 = neutral or balanced, -1 = 
unsupportive, and -2 = highly unsupportive (no positive words). To decide the tone of the news 
stories, the quantity of pro-con quotes, title, lead, and narrative wording was examined; to 
decide the tone of the opinion pieces (including presidential speeches), the authors’ overall 
attitude was assessed. 
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Public Agenda and Public Attitude. From 1965 to 2007, the Gallup poll asked the 
respondents 150 times: “What do you think is the most important problem facing the country 
today?” Similar questions were also asked consecutively in many years by other poll houses 
such as Harris and the Pew Center. Twenty-five of those questions were chosen to draw the 
quarterly and yearly latent series of public agenda. Sixteen other questions inquiring 
respondents’ attitude toward environmental expenditure were used to draw the yearly latent 
series on public support to the environment; there was not enough information in the sixteen 
series to draw a quarterly latent series of public attitude. 
Policymaking. Scholars believe that “[g]overnment spending is the most obvious and 
easily accessible empirical measure of the policy agenda”(Soroka 2002, p56). The data of U.S. 
government spending for natural sources and the environment from 1965 to 2007, available from 
Table 3.1 in the historical table at the end of the 2009 federal budget, were used to measure the 
policymaking on environmental issues.   
           This study is therefore based on three sets of data. A yearly dataset (1965-2007) from the 
poll and budget data contains the variables of public agenda, public attitude, and policymaking. 
A quarterly dataset (1980-2007) mainly gained from the content analysis contains the variables 
of presidential agenda, presidential attitude, media agenda, media attitude, and the quarterly 
public agenda. The third dataset, yearly (1980-2007) is constructed to connect the previous two 
datasets and analyze the relationship between media attitude and public attitude. This approach 
of examining the relationships among the importance of a single issue across the media, public 
and the president is the second type in the typology of agenda-setting studies, natural history 
(Wanta and Alkazemi 2017) 
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Vector Autoregression (VAR) modeling is powerful to capture the dynamics and 
causalities among several time series and is becoming popular in longitudinal studies in social 
science (Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989) and communication research (Groschek 2011; Meraz 
2011). After testing the unit roots and detrending the series (see Table 1) to meet the assumptions 
of the modeling, three VAR models were built for the three datasets based on the pretest and 
posttest model-choosing information criteria and the model-fitness indicators. However, since 
VAR coefficients of the lags greater than one are mixture of the direct and indirect effects 
produced in the previous lags (McCarty and Schmidt 1997), we formally tested our hypotheses 
and research question with the multivariate Granger Causality tests based on the VAR models 
(Freeman et al. 1989; McCarty and Schmidt 1997) as well as the two types of bivariate Granger 
Causality (F and Chi-square) tests (Hamilton et al. 2011). Since the multivariate Granger 
Causality test examines relationships among multiple variables at the same time, it is considered 
more conservative, and providing stronger evidence, than the two bivariate direct Granger 
Causality tests. Among the two bivariate tests, the F test is more often used, and the Chi-square 
test is an alternative for reference when the F test loses its power in cases with long-lagged data 
(Kirchgassner, Wolters, and Hassler 2013).  
All Granger Causality tests gauge if the historical data of the independent variable make a 
statistically significant difference in predicting the data of the dependent variable at a time point 
(Groschek 2011). Although Granger Causality test can still not intrinsically meet all the 
requirements of a causality test, it is far better than any other methods that social scientists have 
so far (Groschek 2011; Meraz 2011) because it examines causality with longitudinal data of 
dynamic processes and examines the temporal factor (Soroka 2002).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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Results 
          The data showed that environmental agenda and attitude changed among the presidents, 
the media and the public. During an average quarter, Clinton talked about the environment for 
7.61 times with an positive tone of 6.9, peaking the presidential discourses on the environment, 
while Reagan addressed the environment for only 1.45 times with a lukewarm tone of 0.55. 
Reagan was also the only president talking about the environment with a negative tone 
(mentioning negative points more than positive points) in two quarters, the third quarter of 1985 
and the fourth of 1988. Only better than him was George W. Bush (agenda, 2.96, attitude, 2.22), 
followed by Carter (agenda, 3.5, attitude, 3.25), and then George H. W. Bush (agenda, 5.4, 
attitude, 4.87). Media agenda and attitude (data started in 1980) peaked in 1990, which could be 
partly resulted from the unusual hot summer of 1989, and spiked again in 2000, when Al Gore 
was campaigning against George H. W. Bush. Public agenda on the environment rose to the first 
height in the 1970s, possibly triggered by the Santa Barbara oil spill, then peaked also around 
1990, and then generated the third spike in around 2000. Federal outlay in natural resources and 
environment in general iincreased from 1965 to 2007, but dropped in 1981 when Reagan took 
office, and did not catch up the 1980 spending until 1988, when his presidency was about over. 
The outlay dropped slightly again in 1996 and 1997 and significantly in 2005 and 2007. 
The results of the hypotheses and research question testing are presented in the order of 
the datasets, from the quarterly dataset to the yearly datasets, instead of the order of the 
hypotheses. 
Quarterly Dataset  
A VAR(8) model was built for the quarterly data to test H1, H4, H5, and the RQ (see 
Table 2 and Figure 2). H1 stated that media agenda would set public agenda, which was partly 
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supported. Whereas the multivariate Granger Causality test (χ2(8) = 39.67, p < .001) and the 
bivariate F test (F(8, 95) = 3.03, p = .005) significantly supported the hypothesis, the bivariate 
Chi-square test failed to reject the null. Considering that the multivariate test represented the 
real-life dynamic better, the evidence to support H1 was still strong. Both of the bivariate tests 
(χ2(8) = 27.95, p < .001; F(8, 95) = 7.90, p < .001) also showed that public agenda on the 
environment caused changes in media agenda on the environmental issues. Hence, media agenda 
and public agenda on environmental issues showed a feedback relationship, in which the two 
variables caused changes in each other. 
[Insert Table 2 & Figure 2 about here] 
          H4 hypothesized that presidential agenda would cause changes in media agenda, which 
was supported by the multivariate test (χ2(8) = 18.94, p = .015) and the bivariate F test (F(8, 95) 
= 3.34, p = .002) but not the bivariate Chi-square test. The bivariate F test suggested that, on 
environmental issues, media agenda also caused presidential agenda (F(8, 95) = 3.69, p < .001).  
          H5 predicted that presidential attitude on the environment would be a cause of media 
attitude on the environment, which was again supported by the multivariate test (χ2(8) = 17.51, p 
= .025) and the bivariate F test (F(8, 95) = 2.08, p = .045) but not the bivariate Chi-square test. 
Evidence also suggested that media attitude caused changes in presidential attitude (for the 
multivariate Chi-square test, χ2(8) = 19.56, p = .012; for the bivariate F test, F(8, 95) = 2.80, p 
= .008). 
          The research question asked if there would be any other interactions in the dynamics of the 
environmental discourse. In addition to the aforementioned relationships, all three tests also 
supported that media agenda was a cause of media attitude (for the multivariate test, χ2(8) = 
36.59, p < .001; for the bivariate tests, χ2(8) = 17.08, p = .029, and F(8, 95) = 4.83, p < .001), and 
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two tests showed that media attitude caused media agenda (for the multivariate test, χ2(8) =  
40.01, p < .001; for the bivariate F test, F(8, 95) = 4.17, p < .001). Meanwhile, all three tests 
supported that presidential agenda caused changes in presidential attitude (for the multivariate 
test, χ2(8) = 99.39, p < .001; for the bivariate tests, χ2(8) = 17.08, p = .029, and F(8, 95) = 4.83, p 
< .001),  whereas only the two bivariate tests suggested that presidential attitude also caused 
changes in presidential agenda (χ2(8) = 59.95, p < .001, and F(8, 95) = 16.95, p < .001).  
Yearly (43-obs) Dataset  
For the 43-observation yearly dataset, all indicators supported a VAR (3) model, which 
was used to test H2 and H6 (see Table 3 and Figure 2). H2 predicted that public agenda on the 
environment would cause public attitude on the environment to change, which was supported by 
all three tests (for the multivariate test, χ2(3) = 14.65, p = .002; for the bivariate tests: χ2(3) = 
13.97, p = .003; F(3, 36) = 3.90, p = .016). Meanwhile, the bivariate tests suggested that public 
attitude also caused the public agenda to change (χ2(3) = 14.28, p = .003; F(3, 36) = 3.98, p 
= .015). H6, which stated that public attitude would cause policymaking ot change, was not 
supported by any of the tests. The bivariate tests, however, showed that public agenda caused 
changes in policymaking (χ2(3) = 16.63, p < .001; F(3, 36) = 4.64, p = .008). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Yearly (28-obs) Dataset 
A VAR(1) model was selected for this dataset to test H3 (see Table 4 and Figure 2). H3 
predicted that media attitude on the environment caused changes in public attitude on the 
environment. It was only supported by the bivariate Chi-square test (χ2(1) = 5.49, p = .019). The 
multivariate Granger Causality test showed that public attitude caused media attitude to change 
(χ2(1) = 5.10, p = .024). 
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Has the public influenced the federal environmental outlays in the past decades, as 
expected by advocates of  citizen participation in environmental democracy, like Fischer (2000, 
2017)? With a substantial amount of reliable data, this study seems to answer maybe. The 
public’s willingness of spending more money on the environment, however, has no influence on 
the policy making. The bivariate Granger tests show that the policymaking is responsive to the 
public agenda, but this causality disappears when the presidents and the media are also 
considered in the picture. The VAR(3) model shows that policymaking has a statistically 
significant negative influence on both public agenda and public attitudes at lag three, which 
suggests that the public closely watches and responds to the federal environmental outlays in 
three years. The political authorities’ irresponsiveness to the public on environmental issues is 
even more apparent when the presidents’ relationship with the public is examined. The 
multivariate Granger test supports that the presidential agenda influences the public agenda, 
whereas the other way around has no supporting evidence. The VAR(8) model also shows that 
the presidential agenda has influences on the public agenda, first negative and later positive, 
whereas public agenda has no input in the presidential agenda. Findings of previous research on 
public’s influence on environmental policymaking (Agnone 2007; Erikson, Mackuen, and 
Stimson 2002; Hartley 1995; Smith 2002) is not solidly confirmed in this study when the 
president and the media are also considered in the analysis. 
          The dynamics among the presidents, the media, and the public (Scheufele 1999; Wanta 
and Alkazemi 2017) in the environmental discourse found in this study is consistent with 
Habermas’ (2006) idea of “media society,” which argues that the media are at the center of the 
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public spheres in developed societies, mediating the communications between the political elites 
and the public, as the size of modern society makes it impossible for political elites to 
communicate with the public personally. The mediation, however, usually distorts the messages. 
This is probably why we found the environmental policy and the presidents unresponsive to 
public opinion on environmental issues and why scholars call upon cautious readers to deliberate 
even when consuming information from credible media (Page 1996). 
          This set of environmental data also provides supporting evidence to the five-level 
integrated media effects model, both horizontally and vertically, at the levels of agenda and 
attitude. Horizontally, agenda (volume of information; McCombs and Reynolds 2009, McCombs 
and Shaw 1972;) and frame (tone toward the environment; Borah 2011, Scheufele 1999) building 
and setting processes are all supported by the multivariate tests, except for the hypothesis of 
media attitude’s leading the public attitude. The president’s agenda leads the media agenda, 
which further lead the public agenda; the president’s attitude leads the media attitude, which 
further leads the public attitude (although with weaker evidence). A school of media sociologists 
argues that mass media may have little influence in the modern area (Klapper 1960; Perse and 
Lambe 2016), the results of this study indicate otherwise. The processes, nevertheless, are more 
complex than discussions in the literature. The VAR models show that the lagged effect can be 
mixed, not just purely positive or negative. For example, statistically significant VAR 
coefficients show that presidential attitude on environmental issues in the first quarter influence 
the media attitude positively in the third and fourth quarters but negatively in the fifth and sixth 
quarters.  
The study also reveals the other side often ignored by media effects researchers 
(Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar 2016; Wanta and Alkazemi 2017): the agenda and frame 
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building and setting processes may not be unidirectional but reciprocal, at least on the topic of 
the environment. Evidence for the causal relationships from public agenda and attitude to media 
agenda and attitude and from media agenda and attitude to presidential agenda and attitude is as 
strong as, or sometimes even stronger than, that for the causalities in the agenda and frame 
building and setting processes. The positive causal relationship from the public to the media is 
actually more evidential than the other way around, which echoes Novic and Sandman’s (1974) 
argument. The media not only influence the public but also follow the public when its agenda 
and attitude on the environment change. When the presidents address the environmental issues, 
the media also follow; at the same time, the presidents also listen to the media possibly for 
feedback. Those findings remind us to view mass media effects in a more dynamic way. 
           Vertically, the study also provides evidence for the internal relationships among two of 
the five levels of media effects in the integrated media effects model. Within each of the three 
subjects, the president, the media, and the public, although some evidence shows that their 
attitude on the environment causes their agenda on the environment to change, all Granger 
Causality tests support that their agenda causes changes in their attitude. This suggests that, as 
Mcleod and Reeves (1980) speculated, media effects linearly go from a lower level to a higher 
level. The linearity of the media effects also helps to explain cultivation researchers’ claim that 
long-term media exposure changes audience knowledge, attitude, and behavior to the direction 
led by the mass media.  
 Despite its solid longitudinal data and advanced analytical techniques to catch the 
temporal factors, this study has its limitations that need to be kept in mind while interpreting its 
findings. First, the data, although covering three to four decades, do not cover recent 
development, and the latest changes in the dynamics among the president, media, and public may 
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be missed. Second. The keywords to search the texts for content analyses, although seemingly 
comprehensive, may miss some texts, and the public opinion poll to measure public agenda and 
attitude may contain public bias also. Third, different news stories or presidential texts may have 
different influences, which is uncontrollable in this study. Also, other sources and forms of 
communication, such as personal communication, radio news programing, CNN news (only 
covered around 1% of the adult population in the study time, Althaus 2002), and the internet 
communication emerging in the 1990s (although at the early stage most of its contents were 
mainly from the newspapers and TVs, Kawamoto 2003) but only starting to pick up a news 
audience since 2004 (Waldman 2011) are not included in this study. Those factors, however, 
could have some impacts on the public opinions and attitudes and should be considered in 
applying the findings of this study to understand the dynamics of environmental discourse 
among the president, the media, and the public and the public’s influence on policymaking as 
measured by the federal environmental spending. Finally, only two levels of the integrated model 
are tested and supported with data in this study, and other levels of the model are in need to be 
tested in future research. 
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Table 2 Granger Causality Tests on the Quarterly Data 
 
Direction 
VAR Granger 
Causality Test 
Bivariate Granger Causality Test 
Chi-
square (df) 
p Chi-
square 
(df) 
p F (df1, df2) p 
S4. Media-Agenda 
à S4.Media-Attitude 
36.59 (8) <.001* 17.08 (8) .029* 4.83 (8,95) <.001* 
S4.Media-Attitude à 
S4.Media-Agenda  
40.01 (8) <.001* 14.74 (8) .065 4.17 (8,95) <.001* 
S4.Presidential-
Agenda à 
S4.Media-Agenda 
18.94 (8) .015* 11.83 (8) .159 3.34 (8,95) .002* 
S4.Media-Agenda à 
S4.Presidential-
Agenda  
9.37 (8) .312 13.04 (8) .111 3.69 (8, 95) <.001* 
S4.Media-Attitude à 
D4S4.Presidential-
Attitude 
19.56 (8) .012* 9.89 (8) .273 2.80 (8,95) .008* 
S4.Presidential-
Agenda à 
D4S4.Presidential-
Attitude 
99.39 (8) <.001* 17.08 (8) .029* 4.83 (8,95) .001* 
D4S4.Presidential-
Attitude à 
S4.Presidenital-
Agenda 
5.87 (8) .661 59.95 (8) <.001* 16.95(8,95) <.001* 
S4.Public-Agenda à 
S4.Media-Agenda 
12.27 (8) .140 27.95 (8) <.001* 7.90 (8,95) <.001* 
S4.Media-Agenda à 
S4.Public-Agenda 
39.67 (8) <.001* 10.70 (8) .219 3.03 (8,95) .005* 
S4.Public-Agenda à 
S4.Presidential-
Agenda 
5.87 (8) .661 3.93 (8) .863 1.11 (8,95) .363 
S4.Presidential-
Agenda à 
S4.Public-Agenda 
31.60 (8) <.001* 8.87 (8) .354 2.51 (8,95) .016* 
D4S4. Presidential-
Attitude à S4. 
Media-Attitude 
17.51 (8) .025* 7.37 (8) .497 2.08 (8,95) .045* 
Notes: 1. In the table, D stands for the first one-lag difference, and S4 stands for the first seasonal 
difference. The variable before the arrow is the independent variable, and the one after the arrow is the 
dependent variable. * means significant at the 0.05 level. 
           2. The bivariate Granger Causality tests also have eight lags. 
           3. See Table 4.2 Notes for a tentative explanation of the difference between the results of the 
multivariate and the bivariate Granger Causality tests. 
45 
 
  
Table 3 Granger Causality Tests on the Yearly Data (43-obs) 
 
Direction 
VAR Granger 
Causality Test 
Bivariate Granger Causality Test 
Chi-
square 
(df) 
p Chi-
square (df) 
p F (df1, df2) p 
Public-Agenda à 
D.Public-Attitude 
14.65 (3) .002* 13.97 (3) .003* 3.90 (3,36) .016* 
D.Public-Attitude à 
Public-Agenda  
4.16 (3) .245 14.28 (3) .003* 3.98 (3,36) .015* 
Public-Agenda à 
D.Log(Policymaking) 
1.47 (3) .689 16.63 (3) <.001* 4.64 (3,36) .008* 
D.Log(Policymaking) 
à Public-Agenda  
6.28 (3) .099 3.61 (3) .307 1.01 (3,36) .401 
D.Public-Attitude à 
D.Log(Policymaking) 
0.72 (3) .869 6.74 (3) .081 1.88 (3,36) .15 
D.Log(Policymaking) 
à D.Public-Attitude  
7.72 (3) .052 4.58 (3) .205 1.28 (3,36) .296 
Notes: 1. For the operators, D stands for the first one-lag difference, and Log stands for a Logarithm 
transformation.  The variable before the arrow is the independent variable, and the one after the arrow is the 
dependent variable. * means significant at the 0.05 level. 
           3.  Bivariate Granger Causality tests are also run with three lags. 
            4. Usually the results of VAR Granger Causality test and the Bivariate Granger Causality tests are 
very similar.1 But here in some of the tests the VAR Granger tests are dramatically different from the 
bivariate tests. A tentative explanation is that the presence of some variables significantly influences the 
relationship among other variables. 
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Table 4 Granger Causality Tests on the Yearly Data (28-obs) 
 
Direction 
VAR Granger 
Causality Test 
Bivariate Granger Causality Test 
Chi-
square (df) 
p Chi-
square (df) 
p F (df1, df2) p 
D.Public-Attitude à 
D.Media-Attitude 
5.10 (1) .024* 3.09 (1) .079 0.92 (1,25) .347 
D.Media-Attitude à 
D.Public-Attitude  
2.87 (1) .091 5.49 (1) .019* 1.64 (1,25) .213 
Notes: 1. For the operators, D stands for the first one-lag difference.  
           2. The variable before the arrow is the independent variable, and the one after the arrow is the 
dependent variable. * means significant at the 0.05 level. 
           3. Bivariate Granger Causality tests are also run with one lag. 
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Figures: 
Figure 1: The Integrated Model of Media Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Information flow from the media to the audience and within each entity can be analyzed 
five levels: attention, agenda (importance), knowledge, attitude, and behavior (for the media, is 
the behavioral calls). The traditional agenda-setting research studies information flow from the 
media to the audience at the first two levels, while the frame-setting research studies the rest of 
the three levels. Political priming research traditionally studies the process from media agenda to 
audience knowledge or even attitude, although later studies extend the dependent variable to 
audience behaviors. Psychological priming research studies the process from media behavioral 
description to audience behaviors. The processes from the media to the audience can be 
moderated by factors such as media credibility, mess quality, audience mood, and the nature of 
the topic. 
 
Attention 
 
 
 
Agenda 
 
 
 
Knowledge 
 
 
 
Attitude 
 
 
 
Behavior (call) 
Agenda-setting 
Frame-setting 
The Media The Audience 
Attention 
 
 
 
Agenda 
 
 
 
Knowledge 
 
 
 
Attitude 
 
 
 
Behavior 
 
48 
 
  
Figure 2: Causal Relationships among the Media, the Public, the Presidents, and 
Policymaking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:               means the causality is supported by all three Granger causality tests;            
means the causality is supported by the multivariate Granger causality test;                  means the 
causality is supported by both bivariate Granger causality test; and              means the causality is 
supported by one of the bivariate causality tests.  
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